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Conflict entails numerous sacrifices in human resources
in addition to loss of life,

while it is difficult to

appraise the real cost of conflict, one can determine the
number of fatalities.

It is the primary goal of this thesis

to develop an accounting technique by which the human
capital cost of fatalities due to the Northern Ireland
Conflict may be measured in an accepted unit of account.
While the development of a model for measuring human capital
loss is in itself an important part of the study, the
ultimate objective is to arrive at an estimate of the human
capital cost of subversive deaths in Northern Ireland.
In this analysis a representative individual is used to
estimate human capital loss.

The expected earnings stream

over the relevant number of earnings period, discounted at
the appropriate rate of interest and accounting for the
probability of death and unemployment within these periods
is the definition given to the value of the human capital
stock of an individual.

The primary data used in this study

is that which recorded fatalities due to the conflict.
Considering that human capital is an important input in
the production function and that conflict tends to destroy
the more productive portion of tne human capital stock, the
long-run effect of losses due to continuing strife and
conflict are as yet unknown.

In the short-run, however, the

conflict is known to exert a heavy toll on the Northern
Ireland economy.

As of April 1990, the total human capital

loss estimate of subversive deaths resulting from the
Northern Ireland conflict were £186,993,266 for security
forces and £400,493,890 for civilians, resulting in a total
estimated loss of £587,487,156.
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Loyalist - the genet
protestant.

2.

Northern Ireland Office (NI) - mainland adminis i.
headquarters for all Northern Irish Affairs since 1972.
Republicans - militant nationalists who use violence to
turther their aims.

4.

Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) - Police Force of N.
Ireland.

5.
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and Full-time Reserve Police Force.

6.

Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) - The largest infantry
regiment in the British Army with a total strength of
around 6,200 both full-time and part-time. Its role,
like that of other elements of the regular army in
Northern Ireland, is to support the RUC in the fight
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Introduction

With numerous uprisings occurring in what is now called
the Republic of Ireland (Eire), most notably the "1916
Uprising," Eire would eventually gain its independence from
Britain in 1922 and with this independence: Eire became the
V.,

a

t was tantamount to dominion

status, and the British Crown was still reco
external affairs. When the Republic of Ireland established
itself as a country in 1922, six counties in the Province of
Ulster, with a two-thirds protestant majority, opted out of
tnis "Free State" and remaine

an integral part of thp

United Kingdom. These counties became a constitutionally
distinct part of the U.K., the Province of Northern Ireland,
with its own parliament exercising devolved powers and
functions at Stormont.

This link was severed with Britain

in 1949.
For some fifty years the Ulster Unionist Party governed
Northern Ireland. The Ulster Unionists were affiliated with
the British Conservative Party, and its members of
parliament followed the Conservative Party Line in the House
of Commons.
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In the mid 1960's, with the Civil Rights Movement in
America sending shock waves across the western world, the
Civil Rights Association formed in Northern Ireland and a
series of marches and demonstrations ensued. The Unionist
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from 1963-69, Captain
Terrance O'Neill, was sympathetic towards Catholic
grievances, but his attempts at reform led to increasing
tensions amongst the Ulster Unionist Party, which eventually
resulted in a party split in the early 1970's. As sectarian
r P.•

- -3

ish

Government in 1969 deployed the British Army in an attempt
to keep the peace between two extremely hostile Loyalist and
Republican communities.
In 1972 the parliament at Stormont was dissolved and
Northern Ireland was ruled directly from Britain. In the
early 1970's the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), a
splinter group of the Irish Republican Army, started and
intensified a campaign cf terror. In response protestant
terrorist groups formed, and violence on either side bred
counter violence and "tit for tat" reprisals. By April 1990,
2,797 people, including 878 security force members, have
been killed in Northern Ireland since 1969.
The primary goal of this analysis is to develop an
economic technique by which the human capital cost of the
total destruction of individuals as a result of the Northern
Ireland conflict may be measured in an accepted unit of

1
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account. Theoretically, the technique for estimating the
cost of human life lost in the conflict is an extension of
accepted human capital theory. This technique is developed
in detail in section three. While the development of a model
for measuring human capital loss is in
part of this study

important

mate objective is to arrive at

date of the human capital cost of subversive deaths
in Northern Ireland.
Past studies have attempted to measure the human
capital loss due to war.

For example, Giffen examines the

Franco-German War, and Eisner estimates the human capital
loss ot the Vietnam Conflict.

Unfortunately, a summary

report carried out on behalf of the Bank of Ireland is the
only

/ailable analysis of the cost of terrorism to the

economies of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland.
ThP results obtained in the model are but a fraction of
the cost that the conflict imposes upon, say for example,
the area of security. Therefore, it is quite possible to
overlook the significance of the human capital loss. S_Ich a
possibility is addressed in Birkeli's (1971) study:
"Physical destruction, no matter how complete or
how costly can be rebuilt over a short period of
time in a healthy economy; this is not the case,
however, for the destruction of human capital.
Recuperative powers of an economy are very much
affected by the stock of capital; hence, the
reconstruction after physical damage may well be
dependent upon the magnitude of the human capital
loss."

Survey of the Literature

In attempting to estimate the human capital loss
resulting from war, a basic assumption is that one's
capitali..!ed earnings stream is capital and that an
individuals death reduces the stock of a nations wealth.
This section summarizes the works of several notable
economists who used the human capital concept in their
attempts to estimate total economic losses resulting from
war. Gitten and Eisner, in their respeeLive woiks, esiimdted
the value of this loss by placing a monetary value on human
life. Additionally, a recent report, prepared on behalf of
the Bank of Ireland, is analyzed because it calculates the
total cost that terrorism has enumerated on the province of
Northern Ireland.

Survey of Methodology and Estimates.
Giffen.
Giffen, in edition one of "Essays in Finance," embarks
on a project that will estimate the total cost to the
combatants of the Franco-German War (Birkeli, 1971).

Giffen

recognized both loss of life and disability caused by war as
associated costs of war.

In order to illustrate his

estimates as to the costs of war, the following example is
4
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used: The number of French soldiers' lives destroyed is
determined to be seventy thousand. An analysis of this total
indicates that 30,000 were killed, 30,000 had partial
disabilities and out of a total of 80,000, one-eighth, some
10,000 were invalidated on the average.
Giffen recognized that in order to determine war losses
as accurately as possible, human life would have to be
attributed a monetary value, and this value in turn would be
included in the final estimate. This was accomplished.
However, one should note that Giffen believed the estimate
he had obtained to be somewhat crude and imperfect, and,
furthermore, that the losses in war were not amenable to
monetary valuation (Birkeli, 1971).

Although, Giffen did in

fact estimate a monetary evaluation of such losses, this was
excluded from his published estimates of total war costs.
Giffen estimated the average age of an individual who lost
his earning power as a result of war to be twenty-five
years. Additionally, earnings life expectancy was estimated
to be twenty years, and the individual was assumed to be
earning forty pounds annually. Therefore, an individual's
monetary value could be obtained from the following
equation:

where:

VP

=

E R/(1+0'

i = 1,2,3...,2C(d)
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=
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The estimated capital loss which resulted from 70,000
French soldiers' lives being destroyed totalled forty-two
million pounds. Also, it was estimated that 200,000 french
civilians ha a their lives destroyed. However, Giffen assumed
that some 100,000 individuals would be at an age where their
resulting economic value would be of no significance.
Therefore, assuming that only 100,000 civilians lost their
earning power, the associated capital value totalled sixty
million pounds. Note, Giffen assumed that all individuals
who had their lives destroyed by the war had identical
expected earnings and life expectancy.
Giffen estimated that some 50,000 German soldiers had
their lives destroyed, and once again, their expected
earnings and life expectancy was identical to that of their
French counterparts.

The total human capital value of

German lives destroyed was estimated at thirty million
pounds. Therefore, the total human capital value/loss
resulting from the Franco-German War totalled one hundred
and thirty-two million pounds (Birkeli, 1971).

Eisner.
In the "War and the Economy," a Chapter of Why Are We
Still in Vietnam?, Eisner summarizes the cost, as of May
1970, of the Vietnam War. In his estimation he calculates
total fatalities to be 50,067, the total number wounded to
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equal 340,286, and the mean disability rate to be 35.6%
(Birkeli, 1971).
Eisner in the calculations uses an income
estimate, that is: "an annual contribution of
national income of males, twenty years of age and
over."
An average is then obtained from total labor income in 1969
adjusted by total civilian employment broken into age and
sex categories. This average is estimated to be $10,185 per
civilian male age twenty and over.
"Eisner further assumes the average individual to have
forty earning periods left at the point of death or
disablement. Hence, by capitalizing $10,000 (not
$10.185) over forty years at a real discount rate of 5%
and assuming an annual growth rate of productivity
(earnings) of 2%, the present value of the
to be $231,148.
representative individual is estimated
That is:
Average P.V. = Initial Earnings
t = 1,2,..,40.

E (1.02/1.05)t, where

By multiplying this average by the number of
fatalities, the total human capital loss of 50,067 war
dead is approximately $11.6 bn. And by multiplying
35.5% of the disabled by the same average, the human
capital loss resulting from disability totals $11.5 bn.
in Vietnam, to May 16,
The total loss in human capital
1970, then, according to Eisner, is $23.1 bn."

The Economic Impact of The Northern Ireland Conflict.
Terrorism and the political instability associated with
its reign are costing the Northern Ireland economy IRE 358
million as indicated by Table 1 (Davy, Kelleher, and
McCarthy Ltd. Eccnomic Consultants, 1990).

The

calculations attempt to ascertain what each economy (N.

Table 1
Costs of Continuation of Northern Ireland Conflict Per Year
1988 IRC Million
Costs
Security
Northern Ireland
Republic of Ireland
Total

334
64
398

Northern Ireland
Republic of Ireland
Total

23
13
36

Northern Ireland
Republic of Ireland
Total

1
1

Tourism

Energy

Total
Source:

436

Bank of Ireland, The Economic Impact of The Northern
Ireland Conflict (Prepared by Davy Kelleher McCarthy
Ltd. Economic Consultants, 49 Dawson Street Dublin 2,
Ireland, May 1990), p.4.
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Ireland and Eire) would save following a cessation of the
violence. The report highlighted security, tourism,
industrial development, energy and transport as the prime
sectors, in terms of cost, most effected by the continuation
of violence. It also noted that:
"One of the largest hidden costs of the Northern
Ireland Conflict may well be the inconvenience to
ordinary citizens caused by the activities of
terrorists and the response of the security forces to
these activities."
The study acknowledges that the greatest cost of the
conflict had been in terms of human life, however, no
estimate of this cost was given.
"One obvious consequence of civil disturbances is the
escalation of security and public order costs.
Terrorist activity in Northern Ireland has resulted in
over 32,000 shooting incidents, almost 9,000
explosions, and almost 14,000 armed robberies between
1970 and 1988. 2,700 people were killed and almost
30,000 injured in connection with the conflict between
1969 and 1988."
Conclusion
Both, Giffen and Eisner's respective studies, which
evaluate human capital loss due to war, are open to
criticism. Giffen's difficulties result from the fact that
he only employed averages in his calculations. One problem
being that he assumed everyone who had their lives destroyed
due to the war to be age twenty-five because of inadequate
data. Also, Giffen does not employ a growth rate and the
resulting use of ccnstant earnings leads to an inadequate
estimate (Birkeli, 1971).

10
Eisner's study is open to criticism in that his use of
averages tends tc detract from the reliability of the
results. A separation of the data into various age groups
would undoubtedly lead to more confidence in the final
results. Also, if this last suggestion had been incorporated
by Eisner, the use of a mortality rate would have been
possible. The utilization of life tables in place of the
expected life assumption that he used would have contributed
to the accuracy of the final estimate (Birkeli, 1971).
The Bank of Ireland report, estimating the economic
impact associated with the Northern Ireland Conflict,
acknowledyes that the greatest cost of the violence has hPPn
in terms of the human life destroyed. The report goes on to
give statistics of the number of persons killed and injured,
but fails to specify the associated costs. Like...iise, for the
respective sectors which the report focuses upon, there is
no breakdown of the costs such sectors endure as a result of
terrorist activity and the political instability closely
associated with it.

The Basic Model
The model used in this study is based upon the basic
human capital loss equation where an individual's human
capital stock is assumed to be the present value of their
expected earnings stream.
In this analysis a representative individual of a
group/sub-group within each category is used for each
individual within the respective group, whose human capital
was totally destroyed by the conflict. This paper sets out
to determine the 1- individual earnings capacity and from
this the procedure followed is one which estimates their
future capitalized earnings stream, and ultimately the
resulting human capital loss to the Northern Ireland Economy
(Sec Section Six).
The expected earnings stream over some relevant number
of earning periods discounted at an appropriate rate of
interest, accounting for the possibility of death and
employment within these periods is the definition given to
the value of the human capital stock of an individual. The
earnings stream or potential earnings stream of the i"
individual is dependent upon a person's health and mobility,
education and training attained, and the knowledge of the
market for his services (Birkeli, 1971).

11
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For this study, however, income at death is either
known or approximated (see section 4). Therefore, the basic
equation by which to estimate the human capital loss of the
i" individual, as a result of the Northern Ireland
Conflict, is as follows:

1
v

•

- (l+d)

A,

(2)
1 -

where:
VP,

=

•
•
•

11±91
(l+d)

the present value of the human
capital loss of the i th individual
(calculated from estimated age of
death to retirement age).
capitalized earnings stream
adjusted for mortality.
number of potential earning periods
remaining.
growth rate.
discount rate.

Hence, the estimate of human capital loss is dependent
upon the expected capitalized future earnings stream of
casualties, the discount rate and growth rate.
Tctal human capital loss (K) may be expressed as:
•

E VP i.

=

the present value of the human
capital loss of the i" individual.

(3)

where:
VP,

Note, in equation 2 it is assumed that an individuals
earnings (productivity) per annum is subject to a growth
rate. This procedure implicitly assumes a constant rate of
increase in productivity.
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In this study i is defined as those individuals whose
human capital has been totally destroyed by war. The
discount rate utilized is of significant importance since
slight changes in the rate will produce substantial changes
in the final capitalized value. Therefore, caution is of the
utmost importance when selecting a discount rate.

The

capitalizEd earnings stream of each individual must be
adjusted for "normal" mortality. The use of life tables
provided by the Northern Ireland Department of Health and
Social Services enables one to ascertain the probability of
an individual being alive at the end of a particular
earnings period. Thus, capitalized earnings are adjusted for
mortality prior to their inclusion in equation 2 (refer to
Section four and Appendix A).
The approach undertaken thus far is identical to that
of Birkeli, with the evaluation of the position of Northern
Ireland's human capital stock being a partial equilibrium
evaluation. As Birkeli (1971) states:
"We have assumed that the change in the economic status
of the number of individuals (casualties) under study
does not affect significantly the economic status of
the remaining work force; that is, current economic
activity is unaffected. This approach implies, for
example, that the labor market is unaffected by war
casualties and earnings (forgone) can be taken as data.
This assumption is not unrealistic for a war the size
of the Vietnam Conflict. In a larger war, it might be
desirable to devise a general equilibrium model where
casual effects can go both ways."
Since Northern Ireland's Conflict is relatively small
when compared to the United States involvement in Vietnam,

14
this analysis incorporates those assumptions previously
cited, along with the assumption of full employment.

Loss to Whom?
As Birkeli (1971)states:
Unless a beneficiary exists, there is no loss, for
loss is not an absolute, but a relative concept.
Although something may cease to exist unless its
loss creates a void in someone's space, the loss
cannot be recognized. Hence, a man's death is not
a loss to himself since, by the event of death,
his space is redefined. Loss caused by death,
therefore, must be measured in relationship to
that which continues to exist in spite of death.
We may generally define the "loser" as the
potential beneficiary of an individual's life;
that is, he who experiences the void when the
death ocuurs.
Since loss from death and disability is many
sided, we must define that part of the void or
loss that we wish to detect. In our case, the loss
is an economic loss in dollars and cents. It is a
quantitative measurement of the financial loss
incurred by the beneficiaries of the dead and
disabled. Emphatically, it is not a measure of the
total loss, only that part (large or small) which
is quantifiable. Thus, human capital loss is only
a partial estimate of total human losses resulting
from the total or partial destruction of human
lives in war.
For each life destroyed undoubtedly many lives will be
affected. However, Birkeli points out that if an
individual's survivors are deemed the beneficiaries, which
they most certainly are, in the context of this study the
issue of "loss to whom" would likely he unnecessarily
frustrated. Therefore, in order to simplify this analysis,
society as a whole is deemed the beneficiary (Birkeli,
1971).

Non-Casualty Data

The following section organizes the non-casualty data
and parameters in order to prepare for their inclusion in
the final analysis.
The

unavailability of certain data has resulted in the

use of approximations for the productivity rate and discount
rate variables. Similar to past studies, this study does not
attempt to "theoretically justify" the productivity and
discount rates chosen. Instead, in the case of the
productivity rate an approximation was used. The assumption
being that what is true for the sum is true for the
individual and vice-versa. The discount rate was chosen
based upon rates commonly used in past studies of this
nature. The use of approximations and assumptions will
likely be criticized. However, in anticipation of this, and
to avoid charges of over estimation, an effort has been made
to produce a downward bias in the results (Birkeli, 1971).

Earnings Data.
The earnings data used in this study were obtained
primarily from the following three sources: Ulster Defence
Regiment/ British Information Office, The Royal Ulster
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Constabulary-Benevolent Society, and finally, the Annual
Abstract of Statistics for 1989 provided information on
civilian earnings.

Police Earnings Data.
The RUC Benevolent Society provided information on
police earnings according to rank, as indicated by Table 2
(The Police Federation For Northern Ireland, 1990).
Calculations were undertaken in order to provide human
capital estimations on RUC subversive deaths for all
federated ranks. Here, the assumption made was that earnings
data after two years at a certain federated rank were
utilized in our study (for a more complete explanation, see
Appendix A). The earnings figures, effective from September
1, 1989, are gross, neither taxes nor national insurance
have been deducted.1

British Army/UDR Earnings
The UDR and British Army Information Office provided
information on personnel weekly pay according to rank as
indicated by Table 3 (Ulster Defence Regiment, Headquarters,
UDR, 1990).

Earnings per annum were obtained by multiplying

the rates given by fifty-two. In calculations the average
age of privates killed was determined to be 23.3 years.

Due to a lack of information, the Northern Ireland
Allowance--hazardous duty pay that individuals receive for
working in Northern Ireland--was not considered earnings.

Table 2
Police Pay Scales
(with effect from 1st September 1989)

Rank

Constables
On Appointment
after 1 year
after 2 years*

Current Scale
€

9,063
9,690
11,406

New Scale

9,900
10,587
12,462

Hourly Rate

4.74
5.07
5.97

* Entry point for those aged 22 or over who will move to the next
point after three years service.
Sergeants
On Appointment
After 1 year
After 2 years

14,466
15,123
15,654

15,804
16,521
17,103

7.57
7.92
8.20

Inspectors
On Appointment
After 1 year
After 2 years

16,593
17,112
17,784

18,129
18,696
19,428

8.69
8.96
9.31

Superintendents
On Appointment
After 1 year
After 2 years

25,629
26,283
26,934

27,999
28,713
29,424

Source:

For Northern Ireland, Pay and Allowances
(Royal Ulster Constabulary, Garneville,Belfast
8T4 2NX, Northern Ireland).

Table 3
Ulster Defence Regiment-Permanent Cadre/British Army Pay Rates
(with effect from 1 st September, 1989)

Rank

Weekly (Before Tax)
Male

Private 21 and over

178.22

Lance Corporal

220.71

Corporal

266.07

Sergeant

288.47

Staff Sergeant

302.40

Warrant Officer 01

346.57

Warrant Officer 02

393.33

Captain (Daily Rate)*

46.74

Major (Daily Rate)*

58.66

* Effective from 1st April 1989.
ource:

Ulster Defence Regiment, Ulster Defence RegimentPermanent Cadre/British Army Pay Rates (Headquarters,
The Ulster Defence Regiment, Thiepval Barracks,British
Forces Post Office 825, Lisburn, Northern Ireland).
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Therefore in this study the private pay rate utilized was
for those privates 21 years and older. Note all earnings
rates used are for male military personnel.

Civilian Earnings.
It would have been an extremely arduous, if not
impossible, task to gather earnings information for each of
the 1919 civilians killed as a result of the Northern
Ireland Conflict. Therefore, for the purpose of our study, i
is defined as those civilians whose human capital has been
destroyed by the conflict. Thus, the i" individual's
earnings were estimated based upon the following:
1. Since the majority of the Northern Ireland
population between the ages of twenty-five and seventy lie
in the 25-29 age bracket, it was assumed that the average
age of those killed lay in this interval (Northern Ireland,
1987).
2. From the Annual Abstract of Statistics the medium
gross weekly earnings of full time employees, in the 25-29
age bracket, equalled £167.75 (U.K., 1989).
The i" individual's gross earnings per annum (Y), as
of April 1987, is as follows:
Y '87 = £167.75 * 52 = £8,717.

(4)

The earnings data obtained represents 1987 levels, and
therefore the rate must be modified to properly reflect 1990
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earnings. To adjust the 1987 civilian earnings estimate to
an April 1990 estimate equation 5 is applied.
Using the 3% growth rate;

Y'90 = Y'87 * (l+g)n

(5)

= £8,717 * (1+0.03)3
= £9,525.30

Mortality Rate.
Since everyone dies eventually, each person faces the
possibility of having their earning periods "truncated" by
death. Such a possibility varies with many factors, but most
notably age. In calculating the capitalized value of the
fatalities resulting from terrorism in Northern Ireland, the
possibility expressed above must be incorporated into this
analysis. To incorporate the mortality rate, life tables
(for 1984-1986) from the Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of
Statistics are used (Northern Ireland, 1988).

Note, the use

of such tables, as discussed in Birkeli's study (1971),
results in two major problems:
"Principally, the fact that life expectation
prospects continually improve imposes a real
barrier to effective calculations...Furthermore,
life expectancy
differs between sexes and races".
However, similar to the stance taken by Birkeli, these
problems have not been incorporated in the data
manipulations.
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Life tables establish the probability that a person who
is alive at the beginning of the year will die before the
end of that year. For example, a twenty-year-old male has a
probability 0.00130 of dying before he is twenty-one
(Northern Ireland, 1988). Mortality adjustment is calculated
by multiplying the capitalized value of earnings, given in a
particular period, by one minus the probability of dying in
that period, divided by two (to agree with the assumption
that one dies in the middle of their earnings period)
(Birkeli, 1971).
The probability of survival is given in equation (6)
PSi

1 - PDi/2.

(6)

where:
PSi

=

the probability of surviving to the
middle of the i" earnings period.

PD:

=

the probability of dying in the
middle of the i" earnings period.

This formula adjusts for mortality for one period only.
However, with the passing of earning pericds the probability
that an individual does not survive increases. Therefore, to
incorporate this probability into the model one multiplies
the current capitalized earnings value times the appropriate
PSi and, also, times the product of the probabilities of
surviving all remaining periods.
The age interval in the current life table is in five
year blocks. However, calculations are made on a yearly
basis. An example of the method used is as follows:
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The calculated PSi for age 30, for example, adequately
comprehends that period only. Likewise, the calculated PSi
for age 35 adequately comprehends that period only. However,
ages 31-34 are neglected by the life tables. In order to
incorporate the missing data in the model, the PSi for age
30 is used to represent the PSi's for ages 31-34,
respectively, and the Psi for 35 to represent 36-39, and so
on. This was seen as the best means by which to obtain as
accurate an estimation as possible. While noting that this
method may produce a slight upward bias in the final
results, this will likely be offset due to the fact that
life expectancy has improved since (1984-1986), and life
expectation prospects will continue to improve.

Discount Rate.
In implementing a discount rate Birkeli (1971) believed
that:
"Choosing the appropriate discount rate is perhaps
the most arduous task confronting the researcher."
Pointing to, and deliberating on the debate which raged over
whether to employ a social or private rate of discount,
Birkeli, in the end, chose neither and opted to use rates
that had been incorporated in past studies of a similar
nature.
Birkeli's study utilized two separate discount rates,
which were 5% and 10%, respectively.
used a rate of 5% (Birkeli, 1971).

Eisner in his study

Therefore, frcm the
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precedent set by these economists

the discount rate

utilized in this study is also 5%.

Productivity Rate.
The rate of growth (g), or the increase in productivity
reflected in the earnings rate, used in our study, is an
aggregate rate. The reason for this is as follows (Birkeli,
1971):
Since income is an average income for all races
and all levels of occupation, r must encompass
several economic variables, variables which
influence earnings fluctuation.
Birkeli (1971) points out some of the variables that
would tend to influence earnings fluctuation. These,
however, are not discussed here. He also notes that it is
impossible to pin-point what the growth rate (g) should be.
Thus, he employs two rates 2% and 3%, respectively.
In the United kingdom between the 1950's and early
1960's, total real income growth averaged 2.29% per annum
(Cause, 1968).

it continued to average between 2% and 3%

annually up to 1973, but hence fell and remained below 2%
until the early 1980's. Since then the U.K. has had the
highest rate of growth among member countries of the EC and
income growth has been some 3% per annum, a rate of 3% has
been employed in this analysis (U.K., 1988).
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Fatality Data.
In order to accurately estimate the human capital loss,
the fatality data are classified into two categories-security forces and civilians. Additionally, the security
force category was sub-divided into two sections: police
(RUC and RUCR) fatalities and British Army/UDR fatalities.
Table 4 indicates the total number of fatalities by category
per year, from 1969-April 30, 1990.

Security Force Fatality Data.

The data category of prime importance to this study is
that which recorded fatalities due to the conflict. The
original raw data obtained from the Northern Ireland Office
and the Irish Information Partnership are unsuitable for the
task at hand. Therefore, numerous other sources were
evaluated on the basis of whether the fatality information
required for the estimation could be obtained. Both the RUC
and British Army were approached for statistics pertaining
to security force fatalities and the resulting data obtained
from both these sources are introduced here (see Appendix A
for an example of their development).

Police (RUC/RUCR).
The police force fatality data have been developed by
age and rank. Table 5 shows the number of fatalities by mean

Table 4
Number of Fatalities Due to the
Northern Ireland Conflict
1969 - 1990
Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990-to
23
30 April
Total

Source:

RUC
1
2
11
14
10
12
7
13
8
4
9
3
13
8
9
--,
14
10
9
4
7

177

RUC'R'

ARMY

UDR

CIVILIAN

TOTAL

3
3
3
4
10
6
6
5
6
8
4
9
2
9
2
7
2
2
1

43
103
58
28
14
14
15
14
38
8
10
21
5
9
2
4
3
21
12
1

5
26
8
7
6
15
14
7
10
9
13
7
10
10
4
8
8
12
2
-

12
23
115
321
171
166
216
245
69
50
51
50
57
57
44
36
25
37
66
54
39
6

13
25
174
467
250
216
247
297
112
81
113
76
101
97
77
64
54
61
93
93
62
15

92

422

187

1,919

2,797

Northern Ireland Office, Number of Deaths Due to
Security Situation 1969 - 1990 (Northern Ireland
Office., Statistics Branch, Room 8, Dundonald
House,Belfast, N. Ireland).

Table 5
Mean Age of RUC/RUCR Fatalities
by Rank
Rank

Mean Age
(4 = E Xi/n)

Total Number
of Fatalities

Part-time Reserve
Constable

41

51

Full-time Reserve
Constable

38

42

Constable

30

127

Sergeant

35

29

Inspector*

42

16

Superintendent**

51.5

4
269

Total
includes 1 Chief Inspector
*
** includes I Chief Superintendent

Source:

Constructed from information provided by the Police
Federation of Northern Ireland(RUC, Garneville, Belfast
BT4 2NX, Northern Ireland).
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age and rank. At this stage one should note that in Eisner's
study an average age was utiliz,?.d. This was assumed to be 21
years for all casualties, and an average working life
assumed to be 40 years was also utilized. Hcwever, in
reference to these assumptions Birkeli (1971) states:
"Although the use of a mean age of all casualties may
not substantially bias the estimate of human capital
loss, a procedure of breaking the casualties into
actual age groups to be calculated separately would
lend more confidence to the final results. Also, if the
latter approach had been utilized, a mortality rate
could have been properly incorporated in the estimating
formula."
Noting Birkeli's criticism of Eisner's approach, in
order to obtain an estimate of the average age of death of
the i" policeman, the ages of all police personnel,
according to rank, were summed to calculate a mean based
upon equation (7).
4=

X,,/n

I = 1,2,..,n.

(7)

where:
•
XI

•
•

average age of death of i"
individual, according to rank.
each individuals age within a
certain rank.
total number of fatalities per
federated rank.

For example, in the case of police constables the mean
age of death was approximately thirty. Thus, along with the
other information and assumptions the age variable is
employed in this analysis (refer to section 3) in order to
obtain a human capital loss estimation for the ith
constable, and ultimately an estimation for all police
constables (See Appendix A). As previously noted, this same
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process is used to calculate the mean age of death for
police sergeants, inspectors, etc.
Note, for the purpose of this analysis, retirement age
from the RUC is assumed to be age sixty.

British Army/UDR.
Once again the data have been developed by age and
rank. Table 6 shows the number of Army/UDR fatalities by
mean age and rank. Similar to the police data, in order to
obtain the average age of death of the i" soldier, army
personnel were classified according to rank, and ages were
summed to calculate a mean age as based upon equation 5.
For example, in the case of Lance Corporals the mean
age of death was found to be approximately 28. Thus, along
with the other information and assumptions the age variable
was employed in this analysis (refer to section 3) in order
to obtain a human capital loss estimation for the i" Lance
Corporal, and ultimately an estimation for all the Lance
Corporals killed.
Note, for the purpose of our analysis, retirement age
from the army is assumed to be age 55.

Civilians
The fatality data obtained on civilians was most
unsuitable for the task at hand. The only information of use
was the number of fatalities. To obtain estimations by

Table 6
Mean Age of Army/UDR Fatalities
by Rank.
Rank

Mean Age
(a = EXiin)

Number of
Fatalities

Private

23

319

Lance Corporals

28

93

Corporals

31

/5

Sergeants

31

Staff Sergeants*

35

20

Warrant Officer 2

34

17

Captain

36

16

Major**

39

13

Total

609

*
Includes 1 Warrant Officer One
** Includes 1 Lt.Colonel
Source:

Constructed from information provided by the British
Army Information Office, Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn N.
Ireland.
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combining data from various sources, similar to the course
undertaken by Eisner and Birkeli in their respective
studies, would undoubtedly be tedious and result in the use
of approximations. However, this appeared to be the course
to follow. Thus, by combining the data from various agencies
the fatality data have been made compatible with the
earnings data presented earlier. The data obtained from the
various sources are introduced in this chapter. Their
development is undertaken in Appendix A.
As previously stated, the Northern Ireland Office
Statistics Branch, between 1969 and the 30th of April 1990,
has recorded some 1,919 civilian fatalities as a result of
the conflict. To draw inferences regarding the average age
of death of civilians, the Northern Ireland Annual Abstract
of Statistics was reviewed. In particular, the distribution
regarding the population's age was scrutinized. Note, an
assumption made here was the majority of those killed would
be age 25 and over.
For those individuals 25 and over, the 1981 Census and
1987 estimate pointed to the 25-29 age bracket as the
grouping which contained the largest percentage of
population (Northern Ireland, 1987).

Given this information

the median age, age 27, was used as an approximation of age
of death of the i" civilian. The i" civilian being
considered a representative of the civilian category as a
whole. And for the purpose of this study i was defined as
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those civilians whose human capital has been totally
destroyed by the .!onflict.
Note, for the purpose of this analysis retirement age
of civilians is 62.5 years.

Results

The data employed in the preceding chapters and
Appendix A were transferred onto work sheets. Each sheet
contained information necessary to determine an estimation
of the human capital loss of the i" individual, given the
productivity growth rate, the discount rate and the
mortality rate adjustment. Note, each sheet had a value for
the mean age of individuals per group (in the case of the
security forces each group was constructed on the basis of
rank-refer to section five). The data compiled are applied
to equation 2, on a category/group basis, and an estimate of
the human capital loss of the i" individual per category/
group was calculated. Likewise, these estimates, along with
the total number of individuals killed per classification
were applied to equation 3 and total human capital loss per
category/group was calculated. The results of such estimates
yield a pound estimate for the civilian and security fcrce
categories. Tables 7 through 9

show the total human capital

loss for the i" individual and each category/group,
respectively.
Table 7 indicates the human capital loss estimation of
RUC/RUCR fatalities by rank. One sees the largest total
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Tabl(?. 7
Human Capital loss estimation ot RUC/ RUCH
Fatalities by Rank

Rank

ith individual's Loss

Total Loss

Part-time Reserve
Constable

69,004.25

3,519,216.75

Full-time Reserve
Constable

195,561.07

8,213,564.94

Constable

246,674.50

31,327,661.74

Sergeant

296,166.75

8,588,835.76

Inspector *

262,336.78

4,197,338.46

Superintendent **

215,996.50

867,968.00

Total

56,714,603.65

Includes 1 Chief Inspector
*
** Includes 1 Chief Superintendent
Source:

Constructed from information provided by The Police
Federation of Northern Ireland.(RUC, Garneville,
Belfast BT4 2NX, N. Ireland).
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loss, according to federated rank, to be approximately £31.3
million as that experienced by police constables. The total
human capital loss estimation for all RUC/RUCR fatalities is
estimated to be £56,714,603.65.
Likewise, Table 8 shows the human capital loss
estimation for all UDR/British Army fatalities, by rank. The
largest total loss, according to rank, is approximately £60
million and that was experienced by army privates. The total
human capital loss estimation for all UDR/British Army
fatalities was found to be £130,278,662.60.
The estimates, as set out in Tables 7-9, show that the
cost of the total human capital destroyed, due to the
conflict, are estimated at £587,487,156.50.
The results of this study are likely to yield many
varied and interesting questions with regard to the total
impact upon the individual within society and society as a
whole. What are the results of such losses on the remaining
members of the community? Also, what implications and
effects, if any, would the current destruction of the human
capital stock have upon future generations in the province
of Northern Ireland?
In both Giffen and Birkeli's studies, it was possible
to compare their human capital estimations to estimations
that appeared in past studies of the same conflicts,
respectively. Alas, this study appears to be the sole
estimator of the human capital loss due to terrorism in

Table 8
Hunan Capital Loss Estimation of British Army/
UDR Fatalities by Rank
ith individual's Loss

Rank

Total Loss

Private

186,843.30

59,603,012.29

Lance Corporal

220,026.40

20,462,454.91

Corporal

239,355.00

17,951,625.00

Sergeant

257,756.45

14,176,604.85

Staff Sergeant *

241,951.03

4,839,020.;)7

Warrant Officer 2

320,908.23

5,455,439.98

Captain

250,808.63

4,102,938.13

Major **

269,326.20

3,777,566.83

130,278,662.60

Total
*
Includes 1 Warrant Officer One
** Includes 1 Lt.Colonel

Source:

Constructed from information provided by The British
Army Information Office.(Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn, N.
Ireland).
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Northern Ireland, thus making any comparison an
impossibility. However, the human capital loss of
approximately f587.5m, stemming from twenty years of
continual conflict, appears small when compared to Northern
Irelana security costs. In 1988, alone, it was estimated
that the cost in security measures undertaken as a direct
result of the conflict were IRf334m.(Davy, Kelleher and
McCarthy Ltd. Economic Consultants ,1990) Furthermore, it
was determined that Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland would, in 1988, have saved IR1436 million if the
violence had ended in 1987.
The summary report carried out on behalf of the Bank of
Ireland, assessing the economic impact of the Northern
Ireland Conflict, indicated that despite high levels of
assistance to industry the industrial development program in
Northern Ireland had been constantly frustrated because of
the levels of violence. Also, the study notes that the
potential exists for greater economic opportunities to be
fostered on both sides of the border if the various degrees
of political alienation between Belfast and Dublin can be
resolved.
The calculations undertaken in the Bank of Ireland
summary report refer to the cost that violence places upon
both economies, Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland's economies, and do not include any economic
benefits arising from the conflict.
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There are many sources of human capital losses and
gains resulting from war. On one side of the coin, so to
speak, the interruption of schooling, conflicting skills,
and technological changes as prime contributors to the human
capital loss resulting from war. Alternatively, military
training, health care, and technological advances resulting
from military research and development are examples of human
capital gains resulting from war (Birkeli, 1971).
Although the human capital estimate may not be the
largest cost resulting from the conflict, it is, however, a
very significant one, and undoubtedly places a substantial
burden on the citizens of Northern Ireland.

Summary and Conclusions

Introduction
Throughout the course of history the cost of war, in
money terms, has been of prime concern to combatant nations.
One need look no further than WW1, and the reparations
forced upon defeated Germany to see the significance placed
on monetary gains. Whereas the trend in wars past appeared
to have been that people were expendable and that physical
materials were of prime concern, this view has reversed
since WW2 with human loss being of prime importance. As we
have become more adapt at counting our dead and the
resulting human capital losses, we have become more
concerned over the number of fatalities. However, in spite
of such concerns the number of fatalities due to the
conflict increase daily.
This study sets forth a model for the purpose of
determining an estimate of the value of human capital loss
resulting from Northern Ireland Conflict fatalities. Data
collected and employed in the previous sections are applied
to a human capital model in order to obtain an estimate of
the value of human capital loss.
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Basic Model
The expected earnings stream over some relevant number
of earning periods discounted at an appropriate of interest,
accounting for the probability of death and unemployment
within these periods, is the definition given to the value
of the human capital stock of an individual. In this study
earnings at death are either known or approximated.
Therefore, the basic equation by which to estimate the human
capital loss of the i" individual, as a result of the
Northern Ireland conflict, is as follows:

VP;

A, *

1 - (l+d)
(14-g)
1 - (l+d)

(8)

where:
VP,

=

A,

the present value of the human
capital loss of the i" individual
(calculated from estimated age of
death to retirement age).
capitalized earnings stream
adjusted for mortality.
number of potential earning periods
remaining.
growth rate.
discount rate.

Hence, the estimated human capital loss is dependent
upon the expected capitalized future earnings stream of
casualties, the discount rate and growth rate.
Total human capital loss (K) is expressed as:
E VP,

i = 1,2...,n. (9)

where:
VP,

=

the present value of the human
capital loss of the i" individual.
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In this study i is defined as those individuals whose human
capital has been totally destroyed by war.

Earnings and Productivity Growth Rate.
The earnings data used in this study were obtained from
the security forces and the Annual Abstract of Statistics,
1989. The capitalised police and British Army/UDR data,
adjusted for mortality, were placed directly into our model
in order to obtain estimates. However, civilian earnings
data was given for 1987, and therefore, had to be adjusted
to reflect 1990 earnings. A productivity growth rate of 3%,
obtained from "Britain 1988" was utilized in the adjustment
process (U.K. 1988).
Since earnings forgone by the Northern Ireland civilian
fatalities is an average (by age) for all occupational
groups, the rate of increase in earnings (g), which is
assumed to reflect increases in future productivity, that
the fatalities might have experienced, in fact, should
reflect all factors that influence productivity (Birkeli,
1971).

Also, note, the three percent rate used in the

estimate of 1990 earnings for the civilian category, was the
same growth rate that applied to all calculations pertaining
to i" individual's human capital losses.

Mortality Rate.
Since everyone dies eventually, each person faces the
possibility of having their earning periods "truncated" by

4
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death. Therefore, in our estimates to adjust for normal
mortality, the expected future earnings stream, capitalised,
of the

ith

individual, was multiplied by mortality

probabilities given by life tables (1984-86), for males,
published by the General Registrars Office (Northern
Ireland, 1988).

Discount Rate.
The objective of this study is to eslimate the human
capital loss to Northern Ireland's Society. Thus, the
employment of a discount rate is imperative to our analysis.
The rate employed, 5%, is based on precedent set by Birkeli
and Eisner in their respective studies (see Birkeli (1971)).

Fatality Data.
The data category of prime importance to this study was
that which recorded fatalities as a result of terrorism in
Northern Ireland. Information on security force fatalities
was obtained from the British Army and the Royal Ulster
Constabulary. From these sources the data received was
developed by age and rank. For each rank, respectively, a
mean age of death was calculated and used in our model.
The fatality data obtained on civilians was most
unsatisfactory for the purpose at hand. However, by
combining data from various agencies, the fatality data

••••
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developed were compatible to the civilian earnings
estimations in section four.
With the assumption that the majority of civilian
fatalities were twenty-five and over, the 1988 Northern
Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics pinpointed the 25-29
age bracket as the grouping which contained the largest
percentage of population. Given this information age twentyseven was used as an approximation of the age of death of
the i" individual. The i" individual being considered a
representative of the civilian category as a whole. And for
the purpose of this study, i being defined as those
individuals, civilians in this case, whose human capital has
been totally desttoyed by conflict.

Results.
The results of applying the data described in the
previous sections is an estimate, in 1990 pounds, to society
of the value of human capital destroyed by mean age, and
rank (in the case of the security forces) for the civilian
and security force categories. Estimates of the various
categories were combined in Table 9, which shows the value
of human capital loss of fatalities due to the Conflict. The
resulting total loss is estimated to be £587,487,156.50.

Table 9
Total Human Capital Loss Estimations
of all Subversive Deaths due to
the Northern Ireland Conflict

Category

Total Loss

Security Forces:
RUC/RUCR
British Army/UDR

56,714,603.65
130 278 662.60

Total

186,993,266.25

Civilians*

400,493,890.30

Total

587,487,156.50

Refer to Appendix A to obtain the i th civilian's estimated
human capital loss.
Source:

Constructed from information provided by The Police
Federation of Northern Ireland. (RUC, Garneville,
Belfast BT4 2NX, N. Ireland), British Army Information
Office. (Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn, N. Ireland),
Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics 1988 (
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, Belfast, 30, June
1987), and Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1989(H1SO,
Register Generals Office).
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Conclusion.
There are many factors other than death which may
affect a nation's human capital stock, and these could quite
possibly develop fror the Northern Ireland conflict. Some ot
these factors, which may result in human capital losses, in
war type situations, eluded to by Birkeli (1971) in his
Vietnam study, include: the interruption of schooling,
conflicting skills and technological cnanges. Alternatively,
Birkeli pointed to military training, health care and
technological advances resulting from military research and
development which benefit society as examples of potential
human capital gains resulting from conflict situations.
Considering that human capital is an important input in
the production function and that conflict/war tends to
destroy the more productive portion of human capital stock,
the long-run effect of losses due to the continuing strife
and conflict are as yet unknown. In the short-run, however,
the conflict is known to exact a heavy toll on the economy.
In 1988, the cost of the conflict, in punts, to the Northern
Ireland economy for the security, tourism and energy sectors
totalled 11;21358m, with security costs alone estimated at
Ifa334m (Davy, Kelleher, and McCarthy Ltd. Economic
Consultants ,1990).

Appendix

In order to illustrate the techniques employed in
estimating the human capital loss due to the Northern
Ireland Conflict, Police (RUC) Constables, and the Civilian
Category are used as examples.

Police Constables
The average age of death of the i" constable was
calculated to be thirty (where n=retirement age (60) - age
of death (30) = 30), with a gross income, after two years
service, totalling £12,462 per annum. The capitalised future
earnings stream was determined by dividing income per annum
by (i+d) the rate of discount (5%), and this yielded a value
of £11,868.57.
The mortality rate adjustment necessitated the use of
life tables. Life tables estimate the probability that a
person who is alive at the beginning of the year will die
before the end of that year. In the case of the thirtyyear-old i" constable the probability of survival (PSirefer to Section Four) is found to equal 0.99905.
The calculated PSi for age thirty adequately
comprehends that period only. Likewise, the calculated PSI
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for age thirty-five adequately comprehends that period only.
However, ages 31-34 are neglected by the tables. Therefore,
in order to incorporate the missin

data into the model, I

used the PSi for age 30 to represent the PSi for age 31-34,
respectively, and for 35 to represent 36-39, and so on. The
resulting i" constables capital value adjusted for
mortality equalled £10,717.86. This, in turn, applied to
equation 2 yielded an estimated human capital loss of
€246,674.86. Finally, applying this estimate to equation 3
one obtains a total human capital loss for all constables
equal to £31,327,661.74.

Civilian Category
The average age of the i" civilian was determined to
be 27 (refer to Section Five), with each individual
receiving a gross income of 19,526.18 per annum. The
capitalised future earnings stream was calculated by
dividing gross income per annum by 1+ the rate of discount
(l+d), and this yielded a value of £9,072.55.
In the mortality rate adjustment process, due to the
fact that the life tables are in five year blocks, the PSi
for age 25, thus, was used as a representative for the PSi's
27-29, similarly 30 was used as a representative of the
PSi's for 31-34, and so forth. The resulting i" civilian's
capital value adjusted for mortality equalled £8,034.72.
This, in turn, applied to equation 2 yielded an estimated

human capital loss of £208,699.27. Finally, applying the
value of our estimate to equation 3 resulted in a total
human capital loss for all civilians equalling
£400,493,890.30.
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